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Editorial 
Sailing close to the wind: Italy in the aftermath of the 4 March elections 
As we were going to press in early May 2018, the deadlock surrounding the formation of a new 
government looked no closer to being resolved than it had in the immediate aftermath of the 4 March 
elections. The focus was mainly on the Democratic Party (PD), which was tearing itself apart over the 
issue of whether or not to support a government lead by the Five-star Movement (M5s). It was 
understandable that Matteo Renzi and his followers were bitterly opposed to such an eventuality 
given their essentially top-down, majoritarian and technocratic perspective on politics. Being in 
coalition with a party that professed a belief in participatory democracy; that wanted to undo many 
of the outgoing government’s flagship policies such as the Jobs Act and the Buona Scuola; that would 
benefit from the media profile, and heightened capacity for leadership, enjoyed by prime ministers in 
recent years; that might blame any policy failures on its junior partner: this was not an attractive 
proposition. Equally understandable was the position of Renzi’s internal opponents who, precisely 
because of the Movement’s ambitions in relation to the Jobs Act as well as other matters, saw in the 
prospects of an arrangement with the M5s, the opportunity to ‘domesticate’ it and to shift the ‘centre 
of gravity’ of Italian politics to the left.  
Such critics were driven by assumptions that had dominated the politics of the old Communist Party 
and the First Republic – that the democratic game was less about the construction of majorities and 
the principle of ‘winner takes all’, than it was about the pursuit of power through negotiation and the 
search for workable compromises – assumptions reflected, in this issue, in the article by Antonio 
Floridia and his discussion of electoral-law reform. For them, negotiation and the pursuit of a left-of-
centre agenda offered the best prospects of addressing the multiple insecurities faced by ordinary 
people and so countering the growth in Europe of populism which elsewhere had led to constitutional 
crises – most notably in the UK, with Brexit – and now looked as though it might just do so in Italy too 
unless the government crisis could be resolved. 
This of course begs the question of whether the two great ‘winners’ of 4 March – the League and the 
M5s – can indeed be accurately described as ‘populist’. Especially in the case of the M5s, the election’s 
aftermath provoked some debate about this. We think that it is a populist party; for such a party – we 
would argue – is one that not only claims to represent the interests of ‘the pure people’ against the 
‘corrupt elite’ but claims to have a monopoly on the ability to do so where the ‘corrupt elite’ is 
represented by competitor parties. Therefore, the genuinely populist party is one that implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly challenges the liberal component of liberal democracy by implying a) that the 
support of a majority of the people is alone sufficient to justify actions when in office, and b) that other 
parties are not legitimate contenders for government.  
The M5s, with its diatribes against ‘la casta’ certainly has strongly populist characteristics in terms of 
rhetoric. It does also tend to imply that it has a monopoly on the ability to represent ordinary people 
and that the other parties are illegitimate as potentially governing actors. And one might also argue 
that its dismissal of liberal principles in this sense is reflected in one of its flagship policies, with its 
apparent ambition to abolish, in the name of the people against the ‘casta’, article 67 of the Italian 
constitution which stipulates that ‘each Member of Parliament represents the Nation and carries out 
their duties without a binding mandate’. For the Movement, the Member of Parliament should not be 
free of mandates; for in its conception parliamentarians are delegates, not trustees, bound by the will 
of those who got them elected. This, in our view, is populist because it eliminates the space for 
deliberation and so offends against the liberal principle that decisions should be preceded by 
authentic discussion and debate, and not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. 
Still, this perspective on the M5s is by no means a matter of consensus and readers will find a 
somewhat contrasting view set out in the article by Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti 
in this issue. 
What is less contentious is the suggestion that the rise of populism and the democratic crisis in Europe 
has generated, in the search for solutions, considerable reflection both within and beyond the walls 
of academia, about the nature of democracy and the criteria that must be fulfilled if it is to be of high 
quality. Both the article by Floridia and the one by Lorenzo Cini and Andrea Felicetti should be read 
very much in this vein. Whether participatory and deliberative perspectives can ever actually be 
reconciled – philosophically if not practically – is something we would doubt; for if the former is based 
on assumptions of separateness, inequality and the pursuit of power, the latter denies these things. 
Still, in considering in their different ways, what is the single most fundamental issue in European and 
Italian politics today, Cini’s and Felicetti’s suggestions, as those of Floridia, perform a very useful 
service in responding to Sartori’s call for a political science that is applied – that produces knowledge 
which is, ‘to some extent, ‘useful’ for the well-being of society at large’ (Pasquino and Valbruzzi, 2017: 
230). Much the same can be said of the piece by Gianluca Passarelli and Dario Tuorto which explores 
how the three largest parties have responded, in more or less innovative ways, to one of the most 
significant fallouts of the democratic crisis – the weakening of the linkages between parties and their 
members – and therefore what party membership in Italy now means. 
Finally, it could be argued that the kind of democratising reform Cini and Felicetti call for is to some 
extent already to be found, as Raffaele Marchetti’s article suggests, in the interaction and synergy 
between the Italian government (especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and civil society 
organisations, that has enabled Italy to play a leading role in bringing about normative change at an 
international level. Marchetti’s conclusion – that both the government and civil-society organisations 
– have derived considerable tangible benefits from the synergy between them, should serve as an 
antidote to the overly pessimistic perspectives on Italian politics and the health of Italian democracy 
to which one might otherwise be inclined in the aftermath of the 4 March elections. 
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